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Abstract:  
Two experiments examined the role of expertise, consensus, and informational valence on 
children's acceptance of informant testimony about the quality of work produced by a target 
child. In Experiment 1, 96 4- to 5.9-year-olds and 6- to 8-year-olds were told about an expert 
who gave a positive or negative assessment of art or music that was contradicted by one 
layperson or a consensus of three laypersons. Generally, participants endorsed positive 
assessments as correct irrespective of expertise and consensus, but older children were more 
likely than younger children to want to learn from the expert in the future. To examine whether 
reluctance to accept expertise was due to the negative quality of the information, the expert in 
Experiment 2 simply stated that additional work was needed. Both age groups selected the expert 
as correct and reported wanting to learn from the expert in the future. Contributions to social 
learning models are discussed. 
Article: 
Young children are sensitive to individual differences in people's knowledge about the world. 
For example, preschoolers understand that informational access is necessary to gain knowledge 
(e.g., Nurmsoo & Robinson, 2009), and they monitor the accuracy of information obtained from 
others to make decisions that guide learning (e.g., Koenig, Clément, & Harris, 2004). Awareness 
of credible sources of knowledge is important for social judgments (e.g., Boseovski, 2012; 
Brosseau-Liard & Birch, 2010), word learning (e.g., Birch, Vauthier, & Bloom, 2008), problem 
solving (Cluver, Heyman, & Carver, 2013), and critical thinking (Heyman, 2008). Consequently, 
it is important to understand the factors that children take into account when learning from 
others. 
Expertise is a particularly potent cue for learning new information (e.g., Aguiar, Stoess, & 
Taylor, 2012; Danovitch & Keil, 2004). Given discrepant facts about a novel animal, children as 
young as 3 years of age endorsed those that originated from a person described as a zookeeper 
rather than a layperson (Boseovski & Thurman, 2014). Three-year-olds also understand that 
different types of expertise are associated with different types of knowledge (e.g., doctors vs. 
mechanics; Lutz & Keil, 2002), and 4- and 5-year-olds further appreciate the scientific principles 
that underlie knowledge when the domain of expertise is familiar. By 5 years of age, children can 
organize knowledge by disciplines that map on to university academic divisions (e.g., natural vs. 
social sciences; Keil, Stein, Webb, Billings, & Rozenblit, 2008). Young children also engage in 
belief revision more readily following the advice of an expert as compared with an ignorant 
advisor; this decision is associated with perceptions of experts as competent (Rakoczy, Ehrling, 
Harris, & Schultze, 2015, Exp. 1). At 6 years of age, children understand when they should ask 
an expert a question rather than rely on their own knowledge (Aguiar et al., 2012). 
Although there is age-related improvement in the understanding of expertise, it is clear that even 
young children are sensitive to this epistemic cue. Nonetheless, children also rely on social cues 
for learning. In particular, there is considerable evidence that children use consensus, or majority 
agreement, to learn new information (e.g., Chen, Corriveau, & Harris, 2013; Corriveau, Fusaro, 
& Harris, 2009; Corriveau & Harris, 2010; Corriveau, Kim, Song, & Harris, 2013). In a study 
that examined children's word learning, Fusaro and Harris (2008) exposed 4-year-olds to two 
informants and two bystanders. Each informant offered a different label for an unknown object 
(e.g., “feppal” vs. “merval”), and the testimony of one informant was met with agreement from 
two bystanders (e.g., nodding heads), whereas testimony of the other was met with disapproval 
from the bystanders (e.g., shaking heads). Participants endorsed testimony of the informant with 
bystander approval. In another study, 3- and 4-year-olds accepted a toy label offered by a group 
of informants over one offered by a single dissenter (Corriveau et al., 2009). In an age-
appropriate modification of the Asch line judgment task, the majority of 3- to 5-year-olds, and 
over one third of 6- to 8-year-olds and 9- to 11-year-olds, conformed to an incorrect consensus 
judgment (Walker & Andrade, 1996). 
Based on the literature described above, expertise and consensus are influential in early social 
learning when their effects are assessed independently. The present study is the first to examine 
what happens when these cues are put in direct competition. We asked whether children would 
defer to an expert or novice opinion about the quality of art and music and assessed whether 
putative deference to an expert's opinion might be reduced in the face of dissenting views from 
multiple laypersons (i.e., a consensus) as compared with a single layperson. We were also 
interested in the effects of the type of information (i.e., positive or negative) on children's 
selections, which is another unique element of these studies that we will describe further below. 
Examination of the relative importance of expertise and consensus will provide insight about the 
mechanisms that drive children's social learning. On one hand, expertise should be especially 
salient because it is considered to be an epistemic cue; people with expertise in a given domain 
are legitimately considered to be more knowledgeable than laypersons in that domain (e.g., 
Koenig & Jaswal, 2011). On the other hand, consensus can also be considered good evidence for 
a claim even if it cannot speak to the validity of the claim (see Bernard, Harris, Terrier, & 
Clément, 2015). In part, consensus exerts its effects for affiliative reasons, including deference to 
others. In one study, preschoolers endorsed the testimony of a consensus of adults who made a 
clearly incorrect line judgment, but proceeded to respond accurately in a follow-up task that 
required independent line judgments in the absence of the adult consensus (Corriveau & 
Harris, 2010; see also Haun & Tomasello, 2011). 
Despite strong consensus effects in some studies, there are other studies in which such effects 
have been restricted, and these studies provide insight about how children prioritize other 
available cues for learning (e.g., DiYanni, Corriveau, Kurkul, Nasrini, & Nini, 2015; 
Einav, 2014). Schillaci and Kelemen (2014) found that children were less likely to defer to a 
consensus when objective information was clearly available. Three and 4-year-olds were shown 
objects for which plausible and implausible functions were described (e.g., a sieve-like item 
described as an egg holder or a vessel for drinking, respectively). Four-year-olds rejected 
implausible functions and 3-year-olds responded unsystematically. In contrast, participants 
accepted consensus information when claims about object functions by the consensus and 
dissenter were equally plausible (e.g., a mallet-like device described as suitable for pounding 
fruit or knocking fence posts into the ground). Thus, consensus effects are qualified when there 
are objective grounds for judgment (Schillaci & Kelemen, 2014). Relatedly, DiYanni et al. 
(2015) found that 3- to 5-year-olds from the US overlooked a consensus that endorsed a non-
affordant tool (e.g., implausible cookie crusher). 
Of particular relevance here, only one study (Souza & Legare, 2011) compared the relative 
influence of consensus vs. expertise information on the willingness to accept informant 
testimony, and it was conducted with adults. Participants heard conflicting views about the 
efficacy of a pai-de-santo (i.e., religious healer) from an expert as compared with a layperson 
consensus. Although both cues were influential, expert testimony outweighed consensus 
influence. In a study by Einav (2014), 5- and 6-year-olds heard a three-person consensus and a 
dissenter label a drawing differently (e.g., orange vs. ball). Participants trusted the dissenter's 
label when they were told that the dissenter had privileged knowledge (i.e., had drawn the item) 
and deferred to the majority when the dissenter did not have privileged knowledge. Although this 
latter study did not examine expertise per se, it is clear from the findings that young children 
prioritize knowledge over social cues for learning in some circumstances. 
The current research examined children's preference for expertise vs. consensus information to 
make a judgment about art or music performance. We focused on performance judgments for 
three reasons. First, the majority of research on social learning has focused on learning about 
object labels, object functions, or object search (see Boseovski, 2012). In examining performance 
judgments, we can determine whether children prioritize social learning cues in the same manner 
across domains. Indeed, research on social judgments reveals that children only begin to use 
consensus reliably in middle to late childhood (e.g., Boseovski & Lee, 2008; Divitto & 
McArthur, 1978) and instead rely on other cues when making trait attributions. From a practical 
standpoint, these studies can provide insight about what kind of performance feedback might be 
potent to young children. Second, we wanted to use a domain in which children had to rely on 
informants to make decisions rather than one in which they could use their own perceptions (e.g., 
a mathematics solution), given that a good deal of research has already investigated children's 
trust in their own perceptions as compared with informant testimony (e.g., Chan & Tardif, 2013; 
Lapan, Boseovski, & Blincoe, 2016). Third, we wanted a domain for which evaluative judgments 
would be relevant given our interest in the role of valence (i.e., positive or negative information) 
in children's social learning. 
Children's use of both consensus (e.g., Boseovski & Lee, 2008) and expertise (e.g., Boseovski & 
Thurman, 2014) varies based on valence. Boseovski and Lee found that participants made 
positive judgments about actors and targets of behavior irrespective of whether they received 
negative or positive consensus information. Boseovski and Thurman found that participants were 
less willing to accept negatively valenced information about an animal (e.g., “very dangerous”) 
as compared to positively valenced information (e.g., “very friendly”), even when the 
information was delivered by a zookeeper. These results are consistent with findings of a 
positivity bias in social judgments that peaks in middle to late childhood (see Boseovski, 2010, 
for a review). However, these effects vary by age. For example, 3- to 5-year-olds in Boseovski 
and Thurman were more likely than older children to accept information from the zookeeper, and 
this finding was pronounced for negative information, supporting reports of a negativity bias in 
situations that provoke concerns about personal safety (see Vaish, Grossmann, & 
Woodward, 2008). Thus, we might expect children's use of both expertise and consensus in the 
current study to vary based on valence and age. 
We focused on 4- to 8-year-olds because this is an age period during which multiple learning 
cues are relevant to children's social learning as described above. Moreover, between early and 
middle childhood, children begin to use trust heuristics in flexible ways that are context-
dependent (Einav, 2014). The current study is unique in providing information about the relative 
importance of consensus, expertise, and valence in children's social learning in a performance 
context. In Experiment 1, participants were told stories about a child informant with expertise in 
art or music who judged the work produced by a target child as either “very good” or “very bad.” 
Participants were also told about the dissenting opinion of a lone layperson child or a consensus 
of three layperson children. We chose to tell stories about child experts based on research that 
indicates that children take into account credibility, irrespective of age, when judging informant 
testimony (e.g., Jaswal & Neely, 2006). This decision was amenable to our story context (i.e., 
given that there is a higher plausibility that there would be three child layperson informants as 
compared to three adult layperson informants in a classroom). We did not vary the number of 
experts, as our question concerned whether expertise would override a layperson consensus. 
Stories were presented such that participants had to rely on informants' judgments of the target 
child's work. 
Participants were asked which informant was correct and which informant they would prefer to 
learn from in the future. Inclusion of both questions was an important design feature because it 
enabled us to assess whether disregard of expertise might reflect reluctance to make a negative 
evaluation, in which case we would expect stronger performance on the learning endorsement 
question, where such an evaluation was not required. To determine whether impressions of the 
informants were related to the valence of evaluation given, we also asked participants to make 
personality judgments about the characters. 
Overall, we predicted that participants would show increased sensitivity to expertise with age, 
but that this would be qualified by the presentation of negative information (see Boseovski & 
Thurman, 2014). Consistent with previous findings of a decreased reliance on consensus with 
age (e.g., Bernard, Proust, & Clément, 2015; Einav, 2014), younger children were expected to 
endorse the dissenting views of multiple laypersons to a greater extent than one layperson 
whereas no difference in endorsement was expected for the older children based on consensus 
level. We also expected that participants would be more likely to attribute niceness to informants 
who gave positive evaluations of the work and meanness to those who gave negative evaluations, 
and that this effect would increase with age, consistent with children's putative perception that 
positive behavior is normative (Boseovski, 2010). Experiment 2 was a follow-up study that 
provides insight about valence effects in Experiment 1. 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants 
There were 96 participants, with 48 4- to 5.9-year-olds (49–71.9 months, M = 59.2, SD = 6.2, 23 
girls), 47 6- to 8-year-olds, and one 9-year-old (72–108 months, M = 88.2, SD = 11, 25 girls). 
Participants were recruited from day cares or a database of parents who expressed interested in 
research participation. Parents signed written consent forms for participants; additionally, 
children older than 7 years of age signed their own assent form. Testing took place in a 
laboratory or a day care in a mid-sized Southeastern city. Information about sample composition 
was obtained from parents of participants and indicated that 54.3 percent of participants were 
White, 15.6 percent were Black or African-American, 3.1 percent were Asian or Pacific 
Islanders, 3.1 percent were Hispanic, and 8.3 percent identified as “other.” The parents of 15.6 
percent of the participants did not disclose racial or ethnic information. 
Materials 
Illustrations of the story characters drawing or playing instruments were shown to participants 
during the story presentations. Illustrations were constructed so that participants could not judge 
the quality of the target child's work themselves (e.g., an easel with an obstructed view of the 
artwork). 
Design and Procedure 
A mixed design was used with age (4- to 5.9-year-olds vs. 6- to 8-year-olds), valence of the 
expert's judgment (positive vs. negative), and layperson consensus level (no consensus/lone 
layperson vs. consensus/three dissenting laypersons) as between-subject variables and story type 
(art or music) as a within-subjects variable. Half of the participants in each age group were 
assigned randomly to receive information from one expert and one layperson whereas the 
remaining participants heard about one expert and three laypersons. Half of the participants 
received positive information from the expert and negative information from the layperson(s) 
and the remaining participants received negative information from the expert and positive 
information from the layperson(s). Order of presentation of information was randomized across 
children for experts/laypersons and counterbalanced for story type. An unrelated distractor task 
was presented between stories. Participants heard stories about characters of their own gender; 
stories with females are presented here. Sessions lasted approximately 15 minutes. 
First, participants were told about a target child who was drawing or playing music. Participants 
were told that the child “sometimes draws pictures/plays music, but she can only draw/play a few 
easy things. [Target] has never taken an art class on how to draw/play music. She only draws 
pictures in her free time. Right now, [Target] is drawing a picture.” Participants were then 
introduced to the expert and layperson(s), for which story content differed by condition. 
Positive Expert-Lone Layperson 
Participants heard about an expert child informant who “draws pictures/plays music every day 
after school and has taken many art/music classes. She knows how to draw shapes/play 
music…she practices drawing/plays music every chance she gets. She shows her pictures/plays 
her music to many people.” Participants were told that the expert child “looks at [Target's] 
picture and she thinks that it looks very good.” Participants also heard about the counter-opinion 
of a single layperson child who “draws pictures/plays music only once in a while after school 
and has never taken art classes. She can't draw shapes and she can only draw one thing…she 
practices drawing/plays music only when she needs something to do. She has only shown her 
pictures to her family.” Participants were told that the layperson child “looks at [Target's] picture 
and she thinks that it looks very bad.” 
Negative Expert-Lone Layperson 
This story was identical to that above except that the expert judged the drawing/music as “very 
bad” and a single layperson judged it as “very good.” 
Positive Expert-Layperson Consensus 
Participants were presented with the same information about the expert informant as described in 
the positive condition above (i.e., a judgment of “very good”). However, participants heard about 
a consensus of three laypersons who made an opposing judgment about the drawing/music (i.e., 
“very bad”). Participants were given the same description of these layperson characters as above, 
except that the information was pluralized (e.g., “they draw pictures…”). Participants were told 
these layperson characters “look at [Target's] picture and they all think that it looks very bad.” 
Negative Expert-Layperson Consensus 
Participants were presented with the same information about the expert informant as described in 
the negative condition above (i.e., a judgment of “very bad”). Participants then heard about three 
layperson characters who made the opposing judgment (i.e., “very good”). 
Afterward, a manipulation check was conducted to ensure that participants recalled the 
information. Participants were asked if they remembered whether the characters “knew a little or 
a lot” about drawing/music. Order of the options was randomized. Participants were also asked 
to re-state each character's judgment of the art/music, “What did [expert/laypersons] say about 
[Target's] song/picture?” The correctness question was the main dependent measure of interest, 
“Who do you think is right about [Target's] picture?” for which they were asked to explain 
“Why?” to determine the basis for their judgment. Then, they were asked trait attribution 
questions about the experts and layperson(s), “What kind of girl(s) is/are [character(s)]? Are they 
nice, mean, or not nice or mean?” Order of options was randomized except that the “not nice or 
mean” option was presented last. Participants were asked a learning endorsement question: “If 
you wanted to learn how to draw/play music, who would you rather learn from?” and to judge 
whether they thought that the art/music was “good or bad,” with options presented in a random 
order. 
Results 
There were no significant differences in children's responses to questions based on story type 
(i.e., art vs. music); thus, this variable was omitted from the analyses reported below. Scores for 
quantitative variables were combined across stories. 
Manipulation Check 
We examined whether children remembered if each character knew a little or a lot and whether 
they could recall what each character said about the work. All participants answered these 
questions correctly except for two 4-year-old males (one in the negative expert-lone layperson 
condition and one in the positive expert-layperson consensus condition) and two 4-year-old 
females (one in the positive expert-lone layperson condition and one in the positive expert-
layperson consensus condition). The experimenter corrected the children and repeated the story. 
Choice of Expert or Layperson(s) as Correct 
Two-tailed t tests against chance indicated that younger children's selections, t (47) = .63, p = .53, 
and older children's selections, t (47) = 1.35, p = .18, were unsystematic when collapsed across 
valence. Both younger children, t (23) = 12.69, p < .0001, and older 
children, t (23) = 15.91, p < .0001, were more likely than expected by chance to choose the expert 
in the positive valence conditions. Both younger children, t (23) = −6.31, p < .0001, and older 
children, t (23) = −3.19, p = .004, were less likely than expected by chance to choose the expert 
in the negative valence conditions; see Table 1. 
Table 1. Means (and standard deviations) for correctness question in Experiment 1 by age, 
layperson consensus level, and expert valence 
  
Layperson consensus Lone layperson 
Positive expert Negative expert Positive expert Negative expert 
Age Group n M (SD) n M (SD) n M (SD) n M (SD) 
Younger 12 2.00+ (0.00) 12 0.25* (0.45) 12 1.75* (0.45) 12 0.33* (0.65) 
Older 12 2.00+ (0.00) 12 0.25* (0.62) 12 1.83* (0.39) 12 0.67 (0.98) 
Note: * indicates significance at p < .01; + indicates no statistical analyses due to lack of 
variability 
For each story, participants were assigned a score of 0 if they chose the layperson(s) as correct 
and a score of 1 if they chose the expert as correct. Thus, scores ranged from 0 to 2 for this 
variable. A 2 (age: 4–5.9 years vs. 6–8 years) x 2 (expert valence: positive vs. negative) x 2 
(layperson consensus level: no consensus vs. consensus) ANOVA revealed no significant effect 
of age, F (1, 88) = .89, p = .35, ηp2 = .01. There was a significant effect of expert valence, F (1, 
88) = 189.7, p < .001, ηp2 = .68. Participants were more likely to choose the expert as correct 
when he or she provided a positive rather than negative evaluation. There was no significant 
consensus effect, F (1, 88) = .03, p = .856, ηp2 = .000, but there was a significant valence x 
consensus interaction, F (1, 88) = 4.31, p = .04, ηp2 = .047; see Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Mean Number of Expert Selections by Expert Valence and Layperson Consensus 
Level for Correctness Question in Experiment 1. 
Asterisks indicate that performance differed significantly from chance (ps < .0001, except for the 
positive expert-consensus condition, for which no test was produced due to lack of variability). 
Follow-up analyses revealed significant valence effects for the no consensus condition, F (1, 
46) = 46.1, p < .0001, ηp2 = .50, and the consensus condition, F (1, 
46) = 260, p < .0001, ηp2 = .850. Irrespective of consensus level, participants were more likely to 
choose the expert as correct when he or she provided a positive rather than negative evaluation. 
Concerning consensus effects across valence, there was a significant effect only in the positive 
expert condition, F (1, 46) = 6.05, p < .018, ηp2 = .116. Participants were less likely to choose the 
expert when there was a lone layperson dissenter rather than a consensus of negative layperson 
dissenters; however, there was a strong preference for the expert in both cases. There was no 
significant difference in choice of a negative expert based on whether there was a consensus of 
positive laypersons as compared with a lone positive layperson, F (1, 
46) = 1.53, p = .222, ηp2 = .032. In both cases, participants showed a systematic preference for the 
positive layperson(s). 
Justification of Choice of Expert or Layperson 
Responses were coded into categories and are presented for Stories 1 and 2 respectively: no 
response/don't know (10.4 percent; 9.3 percent), appropriate reference to expertise or lack of 
expertise (9.4 percent; 8.6 percent), positive evaluation of the informant (12.5 percent; 15.6 
percent) or target's work (44.8 percent; 50 percent), negative evaluation of informant (3.1 
percent; 0 percent) or target's work (1 percent; 3 percent), and other/irrelevant response (18.8 
percent; 13.5 percent). Chi-square analyses indicated that these categories did not differ based on 
participant age, valence of expert testimony, layperson consensus level, or whether the child 
endorsed expert testimony; all ps > .05. Data were coded independently by two raters, one of 
whom was blind to hypotheses. Cohen's Kappas were 1 and .95 for stories 1 and 2 respectively. 
Trait Attributions About the Expert 
Descriptive data are shown in Table 2. As we were interested specifically in children's global 
trait attributions (i.e., niceness; meanness), children who did not generate these descriptions 
spontaneously (16 children in Story 1 and 10 children in Story 2) were given options of “mean,” 
“not nice or mean,” or “nice,” which earned scores of 0, 1, and 2 respectively. Scores were 
summed across stories and thus ranged from 0 to 4. A 2 (age: 4–5.9 years vs. 6–8 years) x 2 
(expert valence: positive vs. negative) x 2 (layperson consensus: no consensus vs. consensus) 
ANOVA revealed no significant effect of age, F (1, 86) = .02, p = .89, ηp2 = 0 or consensus, F (1, 
86) = .003, p = .95, ηp2 = 0. There was a significant valence effect such that participants gave 
greater ratings of niceness in the positive than negative valence conditions, F (1, 
87) = 92.2, p < .0001, ηp2 = .44. There were no significant interactions between any of the 
variables (all ps > .30). 
Table 2. Mean trait attributions for experts by age, story, expert valence, and layperson 
consensus level in Experiment 1 
  
Story 1 Story 2 
Layperson consensus Lone layperson Layperson consensus Lone layperson 
  Positive expert 
Negative 
expert 
Positive 
expert 
Negative 
expert 
Positive 
expert Negative expert 
Positive 
expert 
Negative 
expert 
Age n M (SD) n M (SD) n M (SD) n M (SD) n M (SD) n M (SD) n M (SD) n M (SD) 
Younger 12 1.58 (0.79) 12 
0.83 
(0.94) 12 
1.83 
(0.39) 12 
0.83 
(0.94) 12 
1.83 
(0.58) 12 
0.58 
(0.90) 12 
1.75 
(0.62) 12 
0.75 
(0.87) 
Older 12 2.00 (0.00) 12 
0.64 
(0.81) 12 
1.92 
(0.29) 12 
0.42 
(0.67) 12 
1.58 
(0.79) 12 
0.83 
(0.83) 12 
1.92 
(0.29) 12 
0.45 
(0.69) 
Note: Trait attribution scores: 0 = mean, 1 = not nice or mean, 2 = nice. 
Trait Attributions About Layperson(s) 
Descriptive data are shown in Table 3. Children who did not generate a global trait attribution 
spontaneously (19 children in Story 1 and 15 children in Story 2) were given the same options as 
above and scoring was the same as described above. A 2 (age: 4–5.9 years vs. 6–8 years) x 2 
(expert valence: positive vs. negative) x 2 (layperson consensus: no consensus vs. consensus) 
ANOVA revealed a significant effect of valence, F (1, 87) = 244.3, p < .0001, ηp2 = .74; this was 
qualified by a significant age by expert valence interaction, F (1, 87) = 7.86 p = .006, ηp2 = .08. 
Younger children expressed greater liking of layperson(s) who gave a negative evaluation as 
compared with older children, F (1, 45) = 7.2, p = .01, ηp2 = .14. In contrast, there was no 
significant difference in liking of a layperson who gave a positive evaluation, F (1, 
45) = 7.2, p = .01, ηp2 = .14. Both younger children, F (1, 46) = 52.1, p < .0001, ηp2 = .53, and 
older children, F (1, 45) = 346.1, p < .0001, ηp2 = .88, showed greater liking of laypersons who 
gave positive rather than negative evaluations. 
Table 3. Mean trait attributions for layperson(s) by age, story, expert valence, and 
layperson consensus level in Experiment 1 
  
Story 1 Story 2 
Layperson consensus Lone layperson Layperson consensus Lone layperson 
  Positive expert 
Negative 
expert 
Positive 
expert 
Negative 
expert 
Positive 
expert Negative expert 
Positive 
expert 
Negative 
expert 
Age n M (SD) n M (SD) n M (SD) n M (SD) n M (SD) n M (SD) n M (SD) n M (SD) 
Younger 12 0.67 (0.98) 12 
1.67 
(0.78) 12 
0.83 
(0.94) 12 
2.00 
(0.00) 12 
0.25 
(0.62) 12 
1.67 
(0.78) 12 
0.75 
(0.97) 12 
2.00 
(0.00) 
  
Story 1 Story 2 
Layperson consensus Lone layperson Layperson consensus Lone layperson 
  Positive expert 
Negative 
expert 
Positive 
expert 
Negative 
expert 
Positive 
expert Negative expert 
Positive 
expert 
Negative 
expert 
Age n M (SD) n M (SD) n M (SD) n M (SD) n M (SD) n M (SD) n M (SD) n M (SD) 
Older 12 0.09 (0.30) 12 
2.00 
(0.00) 12 
0.00 
(0.00) 12 
2.00 
(0.00) 12 
.058 
(0.90) 12 
1.83 
(0.58) 12 
0.08 
(0.29) 12 
1.83 
(0.58) 
Note: Trait attribution scores: 0 = mean, 1 = not nice or mean, 2 = nice. 
Finally, there was a significant age x consensus interaction, F (1, 87) = 6.26 p = .014, ηp2 = .07. 
Younger children expressed greater liking of a single layperson than did older children, F (1, 
87) = 9.27, p = .003, but there was no age difference in the liking of three laypersons, F (1, 
87) = .174, p = .678. Within age groups, younger children expressed greater liking for a single 
layperson than for three laypersons, F (1, 87) = 5.93, p = .017 whereas older children did not 
show a difference in liking for one vs. three laypersons, F (1, 87) = 1.03, p = .311. 
Choice of Expert or Layperson(s) for Future Learning 
Two-tailed t tests indicated that both younger children, t (47) = 2.61 p = .012, and older 
children, t (47) = 8.17, p < .0001 were more likely than expected by chance to report wanting to 
learn from the expert. Younger children were more likely than expected by chance to do so in the 
positive valence conditions, t (23) = 6.91, p < .0001, but were unsystematic in the negative 
valence conditions, t (23) = −7.20, p = .479. Older children were more likely to choose the expert 
in both the positive valence conditions (with no statistical test produced due to lack of 
variability; all participants endorsed the expert) and the negative valence 
conditions, t (23) = 2.93, p = .007; see Table 4. 
Table 4. Means (and standard deviations) for learning preference question in Experiment 1 
by age, layperson consensus level, and expert valence 
  
Layperson consensus Lone layperson 
Positive expert Negative expert Positive expert Negative expert 
Age Group n M (SD) n M (SD) n M (SD) n M (SD) 
Younger 12 2.00+ (0.00) 12 0.83 (0.83) 12 1.50**(0.67) 12 0.92 (0.90) 
Older 12 2.00+ (0.00) 12 1.50*(0.80) 12 2.00+ (0.00) 12 1.50*(0.90) 
Note: * indicates significance at p = .05; ** indicates significance at p < .01; + indicates no 
statistical analyses due to lack of variability. 
For each story, participants were assigned a score of 0 if they endorsed the layperson(s) and 1 if 
they endorsed the expert for future learning. Thus, scores ranged from 0 to 2 for this variable. A 
2 (age: 4–5.5 years vs. 6–8 years) x 2 (expert valence: positive vs. negative) x 2 (layperson 
consensus: no consensus vs. consensus) ANOVA revealed that older children 
(M = 1.75, SD = .63) were significantly more likely than younger children (M = 1.31, SD = .83) to 
want to learn from the expert in the future, F (1, 88) = 10.76, p = .001, ηp2 = .11. Children were 
significantly more likely to choose the expert when he or she made a positive evaluation, 
(M = 1.87, SD = .39) rather than a negative evaluation (M = 1.19, SD = .89); F (1, 
91) = 25.6 p < .0001, ηp2 = .23; see Figure 2. There was no significant consensus effect F (1, 
88) = .61, p = .44, ηp2 = .007 and no significant interactions (all Fs < 1.90, all ps, > .16, 
all ηp2 < .02). 
 
Figure 2. Mean Number of Expert Selections by Age and Expert Valence for Learning 
Preference Question in Experiment 1. 
Asterisks indicate that performance differed significantly from chance (ps < .01, with the 
exception of older children in the positive conditions, for which no tests were produced due to 
lack of variability). 
Participants' Impressions of Target's Work 
For each story, participants received a score of 0 if they said that the target's work was “bad” and 
a score of 1 if they said that it was “good.” Thus, scores ranged from 0 to 2 for this variable. 
Eighty-eight of the 96 participants earned scores of 2, one participant earned a score of 1, 5 
participants earned scores of 0, and 1 participant did not answer the question. A 2 (age: 4–5.5 
years vs. 6–8 years) x 2 (expert valence: positive vs. negative) x 2 (layperson consensus: no 
consensus vs. consensus) ANOVA revealed that participants were significantly more likely to 
judge the product as good in the positive valence conditions (M = 1.98, SD = .14) than the 
negative valence conditions (M = 1.77, SD = .62). There was no significant effect of 
consensus, F (1, 87) = .85, p = .36, ηp2 = .01 and no significant age effect, F (1, 
87) = 3.47, p = .07, ηp2 = .03, but there was a significant effect age by valence interaction, F (1, 
87) = 5.64, p = .02, ηp2 = .06. 
Follow-up analyses revealed no significant difference between younger children's evaluations 
(M = 1.95, SD = .21) and older children's evaluations (M = 2.0, SD = 0) in the positive valence 
conditions, F (1, 45) = 1.04, p = .31, ηp2 = .02. In contrast, older children were significantly less 
likely to judge the product as good (M = 1.60, SD = .83) than younger children 
(M = 1.95, SD = .20) in the negative valence conditions. Among younger children, there was no 
significant difference in judgments of the work in the positive valence condition as compared 
with the negative valence condition, F (1, 45) = .01, p = .98, ηp2 = .00. Older children made 
significantly greater judgments of goodness in the positive valence condition as compared with 
the negative valence condition, F (1, 46) = 6.05, p = .02, ηp2 = .12. No other interactions emerged 
significant (all Fs < 2.0, all ps, > .06, all ηp2 < .04). 
Discussion 
We examined whether children trusted an expert's opinion about the quality of art or music in the 
face of dissenting views from one layperson or a layperson consensus. We also assessed whether 
valence of the information impacted participants' acceptance of testimony and willingness to 
learn from experts vs. laypersons in the future. Overall, our findings indicate that both expertise 
and consensus had limited influence in this study. Younger and older children were unsystematic 
in their selections of correctness; they did not reliably select either informant as correct. 
The finding that expertise was minimally influential to children's correctness judgments is 
somewhat inconsistent with accounts of sensitivity to this cue (e.g., Lutz & Keil, 2002). 
Although it is possible that this effect was due to the use of child rather than adult experts, this 
interpretation is unlikely for three reasons. First, the vast majority of participants passed the 
manipulation check that required recognition of informant knowledgeability. Second, we chose 
domains for which it is plausible that children would be highly accomplished (e.g., drawing 
rather than occupational roles). Third, children readily perceive other children as knowledgeable 
(e.g., concerning toys; VanderBorght & Jaswal, 2009). As noted previously, children prioritize a 
history of credibility over age when selecting informants (e.g., Boseovski, 2012; Jaswal & 
Neely, 2006). 
Consensus information alone also did not have a meaningful impact on children's correctness 
judgments at any age. This contrasts with previous findings in which preschoolers in particular 
were susceptible to consensus influence (e.g., Corriveau et al., 2009; but see DiYanni et 
al., 2015; Schillaci & Kelemen, 2014). It is also somewhat surprising given that the information 
offered by informants might have been perceived as equivocal, which tends to increase the 
likelihood of consensus use (e.g., Schillaci & Kelemen, 2014). The use of verbal cues, rather 
than more salient indicators of agreement (e.g., gestures), may have minimized the impact of the 
information (see Einav, 2014). 
These findings reveal that judgments about correctness were highly influenced by valence, and in 
particular, positive information. Although there was a statistically significant difference between 
the positive expert conditions, participants systematically endorsed the expert as correct 
irrespective of the number of negative dissenters. These results are consistent with Boseovski 
and Thurman (2014), who found that positive information from experts was especially potent in 
6- to 7-year-olds' evaluations about the qualities of an unfamiliar animal. These findings also 
parallel the disregard for negative consensus information in the context of personality judgments 
(Boseovski & Lee, 2008) and extend these results to evaluations about artistic and musical 
competence. Negative information from experts did not have the same potency; when the expert 
gave a negative evaluation, participants readily disregarded it. This pattern held irrespective of 
consensus level, although the means were in the expected direction (i.e., fewer participants chose 
the expert as correct when there was a consensus of positive laypersons rather than only one 
layperson dissenter). Interestingly, older children exhibited unsystematic performance when 
having to choose between a negative expert and a single positive dissenting layperson, revealing 
a limit on the influence of the positivity bias. 
Participants' explanations for their choices, product ratings, and trait attributions also reveal that 
positive information was influential. The majority of qualitative responses consisted of explicit 
references to positive judgments of the work (e.g., “because he said it was good”), rather than 
expertise or consensus, and participants rated the work favorably despite not having seen it. For 
trait attributions, participants tended to judge informants who evaluated the work positively as 
nice and those who evaluated the work negatively as mean. These effects were stronger for older 
children, who also judged laypersons who gave negative evaluations more harshly than did 
younger children. It is unclear why younger children gave more positive ratings to single 
laypersons as compared with a three layperson consensus; perhaps this was due to the unusual 
nature of the question in the latter condition (i.e., being asked about three laypersons 
simultaneously). 
Although these findings seem to suggest that children have a limited appreciation for expertise in 
the context of performance judgments, results on the learning endorsement question revealed 
otherwise, at least for older children. These participants were more likely than expected by 
chance to report wanting to learn from the expert in the future, perhaps indicating that they were 
reluctant to accept a negative evaluation when asked explicitly which informant was correct. 
Indeed, for the learning endorsement question, participants only had to indicate a preference for 
one informant rather than make or acknowledge an evaluation. In early to middle childhood, 
children begin to appreciate self-presentational display rules, including those that function to 
treat others positively (Banerjee & Yuill, 1999) or to maintain one's reputation (see Engelmann, 
Over, Herrmann, & Tomasello, 2013). Moreover, children tell white lies to spare others' feelings, 
even if they have difficulty articulating why they lied (Talwar & Lee, 2002). This self-
presentational tendency may explain the dissociation between correctness and learning 
preferences for the older children. As a group, younger children showed consistency in their 
response to the learning preference and correctness question, choosing the expert only in the 
positive valence conditions. Thus, there is age-related change in the use of expertise when the 
question is framed in non-evaluative terms. 
Given that children were largely responsive to expert evaluation when it was positive rather than 
negative, we wanted to determine whether re-framing the expert's negative feedback in terms of 
effort might enhance their recognition of expertise. The concept of effort is prominent in 
children's implicit theories about ability (see Little & Lopez, 1997), and children are responsive 
to information about effort when making ability judgments (e.g., Heyman, Gee, & Giles, 2003). 
Thus, Experiment 2 examined whether statements that the product “still needs work” would 
result in greater acceptance of negative expert testimony in a new participant sample. Because 
children did not have difficulty accepting positive expert testimony in Experiment 1, we 
examined children's responses to negative expert feedback only; also, because there were no 
effects of story type, participants either heard about art or music. 
Experiment 2 
Method 
Participants 
There were 48 participants: 24 4- to 5.9-year-olds (48.5–68.3 months, M = 59.4, SD = 5.8, 12 
girls) and 24 6- to 8-year-olds (72.3–107 months, M = 90.5, SD = 12.0, 17 girls). Concerning 
sample composition, 50 percent of participants were White, 25 percent were Black, 2.1 percent 
were Asian, 16.7 percent were “mixed” or “other,” and the parents of 6.2 percent of participants 
chose not to self-disclose on this variable. 
Materials 
The same materials were used as in Experiment 1. 
Design and Procedure 
All participants heard negative information from the expert and positive information from the 
layperson(s). Age (4- to 5.9-year-olds vs. 6- to 8-year-olds), story type (art vs. music) and 
layperson consensus level (no consensus: lone dissenter vs. consensus: three dissenting 
laypersons) were between-subject variables. Half of the participants in each age group were 
assigned randomly to receive negative information from one expert and positive information 
from one layperson and the remaining participants heard from one expert and a layperson 
consensus. The procedure was identical to Experiment 1 except for the phrasing of the 
evaluations and the presentation of only one story. 
Negative Expert-Lone Layperson 
Participants were told that the expert child “looks at [Target's] picture and she thinks that it still 
needs work—it has some mistakes.” Participants were also told about the counter-opinion of one 
layperson informant who “looks at [Target's] picture and she thinks that it is finished—it has no 
mistakes.” 
Negative Expert-Layperson Consensus 
Participants were given the same expert information as above, but were told about the counter-
opinion of three layperson informants who “look at [Target's] picture and think that it is 
finished—it has no mistakes.” 
Participants were asked the same questions as in Experiment 1. 
Results 
As in Experiment 1, there were no significant differences in children's responses to questions 
based on story type (i.e., art vs. music). 
Manipulation Check 
All participants responded correctly to the questions. 
Choice of Expert or Layperson(s) as Correct 
In contrast to Experiment 1, both younger children, (t (23) = 4.29, p < .0001), and older children 
(t (23) = 2.76, p = .01), were more likely than expected by chance to choose the expert as correct. 
Participants were assigned a score of 0 if they chose the layperson(s) and a score of 1 if they 
chose the expert as correct. Due to the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, logistic 
regression was conducted (see Pampel, 2000) with age in months as a continuous variable, 
consensus level as a categorical variable, and their interaction. The overall model was not 
significant, χ2 (3, N = 48) = 3.32, p = .34, Nagelkerke R2 = .10. There was no significant effect of 
age, (ß = −.82, Wald = 1.98, p = .16) or consensus, (ß = −.77, Wald = .79, p = .37). The interaction 
was not significant, (ß = 1.21, Wald = 2.25, p = .13). 
Justification of Choice of Expert or Layperson(s) 
Responses were coded into one of five categories: no response/don't know (4.2 percent), 
reference to expertise or lack of expertise (50 percent), positive evaluation of informant (0 
percent) or target's work (2.1 percent), negative evaluation of informant (2 percent) or target's 
work (12.5 percent), and other/irrelevant response (29.2 percent). Data were coded 
independently by two raters and Cohen's Kappa was calculated as .85. Chi-square analyses 
indicated that response patterns did not differ based on participant age or consensus, all ps > .05. 
Participants who chose the expert as correct made a greater number of references to expertise 
than those who chose the layperson, χ2 (4, N = 48) = 10.46, p = .03. 
Trait Attributions About the Expert 
Participants made trait attributions with the options of “mean,” “not nice or mean,” or “nice,” 
which earned scores of 0, 1, and 2 respectively. A 2 (age: 4–5.9 years vs. 6–8 years) x 2 
(layperson consensus: no consensus vs. consensus) ANOVA revealed that there was no 
significant effect of age, F (1, 44) = 1.07 p = .30, ηp2 = .024 or consensus, F (1, 
44) = .48 p = .49, ηp2 = .01, and no significant interaction between these two variables, F (1, 
44) = 2.97 p = .09, ηp2 = .06. Mean liking ratings for younger and older children respectively were 
1.62 (SD = .76) and 1.38 (SD = .92). 
Trait Attributions About Layperson(s) 
Scoring and analysis type were the same as above. There was a significant main effect of 
age, F (1, 44) = 6.23, p = .024. Older children gave significantly higher niceness ratings 
(M = 1.87, SD = .33) than younger children, (M = 1.37, SD = .92). There was no significant effect 
of consensus, F (1, 44) = 1.55 p = .21, ηp2 = .02 and no significant interaction between these two 
variables, F (1, 44) = .693 p = .41, ηp2 = .02. 
Choice of Expert or Layperson(s) for Future Learning 
In contrast to Experiment 1, younger children were more likely than expected by chance to want 
to learn from the expert, t (23) = 2.76, p = .01. Consistent with Experiment 1, older children were 
also more likely than expected by chance to do so, t (23) = 4.29, p = .01. Participants were 
assigned a score of 0 if they endorsed the layperson(s) and 1 if they endorsed the expert. The 
overall model was not significant, χ2 (3, N = 48) = 2.04, p > .56, Nagelkerke R2 = .06. There was 
no significant effect of age (ß = .65, Wald = 1.08, p = .29), consensus, 
(ß = −.544, Wald = .49, p = .48), and no significant interaction (ß = −.376, Wald = .21, p = .65). 
The means for younger and older children respectively were .75 (SD = .44) and .83 (SD = .38). 
Participants' Impressions of Target's Work 
Participants received a score of 0 if they said that the target's work “needs work—it has some 
mistakes” and 1 if they said that the target's work “is finished and it has no mistakes.” The 
overall model was not significant, χ2 (3, N = 48) = 1.30 p = .73. There was no significant effect 
of age (ß = −.43, Wald = 1.10, p = .29), consensus, (ß = −.216, Wald = .13, p = .72), and no 
significant interaction between the two variables, (ß = .326, Wald = .53, p = .47). Twenty-nine 
children (60.4 percent) said that additional work was needed; 19 children (39.6 percent) said that 
it was complete. 
Discussion 
Overall, the findings support the hypothesis that children's reluctance to acknowledge the expert 
as correct in Experiment 1 was due to the negative nature of the information. When the feedback 
referred instead to effort and completion, younger and older children selected the expert 
systematically. Specifically, younger children's recognition of expertise increased to greater-
than-chance levels for both questions and older children now judged the expert as correct. 
Qualitative responses also followed this pattern of increased deference to expertise; there were 
more references to expertise and those who chose the expert as correct often referred to the 
character's knowledge in the open-ended responses. Overall, trait evaluations of the expert and 
laypersons were neutral to positive, which was expected given the benign feedback 
(Boseovski, 2010). Finally, a substantial number of children agreed with the expert's assessment 
that additional work was needed, in contrast to the majority assumption in Experiment 1 that it 
was “very good.” 
General Discussion 
These experiments shed light on children's use of expertise, consensus, and informational 
valence to judge the credibility of evaluations about music and art performance. Altogether, the 
results reveal that children are sensitive to expertise as a knowledge cue, but that they overlook it 
readily in favor of a positive evaluation. Consensus also had relatively little impact on children's 
judgments and was used selectively by children to support favorable evaluations. The findings of 
Experiment 2 underscore the potential importance of children's motivations in situations where 
they are asked to judge credibility explicitly. Both age groups acknowledged expertise readily 
when statements centered on the need for increased effort rather than poor quality. 
As noted previously, children show self-presentational tendencies by middle childhood that 
increase with age (Banerjee, 2002). The awareness that one may be judged by the types of things 
he or she says, along with increased social competence that involves heightened empathy toward 
others (e.g., Eisenberg & Miller, 1987), may have motivated children to reject negative 
evaluations. Children become better able to tell and maintain “white lies” with age (Talwar, 
Murphy, & Lee, 2007), and this timing corresponds with the peak of the positivity bias in middle 
to late childhood. 
Participants' increased willingness to accept negative feedback in Experiment 2 may also have 
resulted from the perception of the expert as a helpful person (see Bryan, Master, & 
Walton, 2014). Children understand the association between effort and academic success 
(Heyman et al., 2003); thus, they may have assumed that the expert had positive intentions. In 
contrast, the intention behind the negative evaluation in Experiment 1 may have been unclear. A 
related possibility is that children's judgments reflected greater trust in people who say nice 
things. This is consistent with Landrum, Mills, and Johnston (2013), who reported that 
preschoolers who acknowledged informants' expertise in various domains later judged a 
benevolent non-expert as accurate when benevolence was put in competition with expertise. 
These authors note that children may consider niceness itself as a cue to trustworthiness (see also 
Mascaro & Sperber, 2009). Trait ratings of children were highly influenced by valence and it is 
possible that these impressions guided their informant preference. It is also possible that children 
engaged in inappropriate generalization of positive traits across domains (e.g., judging nice 
people as better at jumping hurdles; see Stipek & Daniels, 1990). These possibilities could be 
investigated in future research. 
Concerning theoretical contributions of this work, current frameworks of selective trust (Harris 
& Corriveau, 2011; Mills, 2013) could be expanded beyond the inclusion of epistemic and social 
cues to consider how and when positivity serves as a heuristic in social learning. Based on our 
qualitative data, self-presentation was indeed influential to a substantial number of participants 
who made references to informants' positive traits to justify their selections. That said, the 
majority of participants who showed a positivity bias referred to the work itself as high quality 
(i.e., rather than talking about the importance of being nice). Thus, it is important to consider the 
influence of positive content in addition to positive informant characteristics on children's 
learning experiences. It is also important to establish to what degree the presence or salience of 
positive information, rather than the absence of negative information, is most influential to 
children's judgments. 
Children's overall disregard of consensus in these experiments was somewhat striking in contrast 
to some studies that revealed strong effects of this cue (e.g., Corriveau et al., 2009). However, 
our studies were aimed at understanding the information that children prioritize when competing 
cues are offered rather than to determine whether they preferred a consensus over a dissenter. 
Thus, our findings are not incompatible with previous results, but rather add to the literature on 
circumstances in which consensus has limited influence (e.g., DiYanni et al., 2015; Schillaci & 
Kelemen, 2014). These results are also consistent with Einav (2014), who demonstrated that 
children value privileged knowledge over consensus information. Here, we extend the finding to 
expertise and to the domain of performance evaluations. Our choice to focus on art and music 
performance may also have encouraged children to err on the side of caution in their judgments. 
Specifically, children may have perceived these judgments as more subjective than object labels, 
which are the focus of many studies. Subjectivity may have made it easier to revert to a positivity 
bias. 
Concerning future directions, it would be worthwhile to investigate further how children 
conceptualize consensus information given discrepancies across studies. As noted by Corriveau, 
Min, and Kurkul (2014), factors such as culture, social referencing, and mental state talk likely 
contribute to perceptions about the value of consensus information. A better understanding of 
these perceptions could inform why children prioritize or neglect consensus in the context of 
other social learning cues. Research is also needed to understand the relation between choosing 
informants as correct vs. wanting to learn from informants, as children may conceptualize these 
questions differently within and across ages. It is notable that the absence of explicitly negative 
information apparently enabled younger children to focus on expertise in response 
to both questions. Although this finding supports our hypothesis, it is important to consider other 
interpretations. For example, rather than reflecting reluctance to acknowledge a negative 
evaluation, systematic selection of the expert in Experiment 2 may reflect younger children's 
understanding of the link between poor quality work and the need for effort. Teachers tend to 
emphasize effort rather than quality for performance assessment in young children (Blumenfeld, 
Hamilton, Bossert, Wessels, & Meece, 1983). Finally, the finding that children accept expert 
testimony more readily when it is framed in terms of improvement has implications for 
education. Although additional research is needed to understand the source of these effects, these 
findings suggest that the phrasing of feedback is important to children's ability or willingness to 
capitalize on opportunities to learn from other people. 
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